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Many strategy scholars remain skeptical about the value of the concept of “dynamic 
capabilities.”  While some see dynamic capabilities as the key to competitive advantage (Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen 1997), others seem to doubt that there actually are such things.  Still others 
believe that they exist, but suspect that they are “born not made” – i.e., they doubt that deliberate 
efforts to strengthen such capabilities are a genuine option for managers.  And some believe that 
while they are a genuine option, they are not necessarily something that confers competitive 
advantage. This note seeks to reduce the mystery surrounding both the terminology and the 
phenomenon.  It identifies some key issues and argues that clarity is served by keeping these 
issues distinct.  As regards terminology, it offers a proposal that seems constructive – but of 
course will really prove to be so only if it is widely adopted. 
Routines and capabilities.  Following my own proposal (Winter 2000), I begin by 
founding the concept of organizational capability on the broader concept of organizational 
routine: An organizational capability is a high level routine (or collection of routines) that, 
together with its implementing input flows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of 
decision options for producing significant outputs of a particular type.  For present purposes, the 
points deserving emphasis here are the connotations of “routine” – behavior that is learned, 
highly patterned, repetitious or quasi-repetitious, founded in part in tacit knowledge – and the 
specificity of objectives.  Brilliant improvisation is not a routine, and there is no such thing as a 
general-purpose routine.   
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“Dynamic” connotes change.  There is a broad consensus in the literature that “dynamic 
capabilities” contrast with ordinary (or “operational”) capabilities by being concerned with 
change.  Collis (1994) is particularly explicit and formal in making the point that dynamic 
capabilities govern the rate of change of ordinary capabilities. Following the example of the 
differential calculus, he points to the existence of second order, third order, etc. dynamic 
capabilities and explicitly makes the extension “ad infinitum.”  This terminological approach is 
adopted here, but with an important caveat as to whether higher order capabilities “exist” in an 
interesting sense.  From a logical point of view, the “existence” of higher order rates of change is 
in question only in the mathematical sense that some derivatives might not exist; and from a 
computational point of view, a time sequence of N+1 values of a variable suffices to compute 
one value of the Nth order rate of change.   But if dynamic capabilities are similar to capabilities 
in that they involve patterned activity oriented to relatively specific objectives, then there is no 
guarantee that the organizational processes governing high order change are highly patterned, 
and substantial reason to think otherwise.  In this important substantive sense, high order 
dynamic capabilities do not necessarily exist.  This point is pursued below. 
The “zero level” in the capability hierarchy.  Constants and technical issues aside, 
everything is the derivative of its integral and the integral of its derivative.  To make effective 
use of the concept of a hierarchy of rates of change, we need a convention to identify the “zero 
level,” the analogue of position for variables moving in space.  Because capabilities are complex, 
structured and multi-dimensional, this question may not have an answer that seems both clear 
and compelling in all cases.  There is, however, a heuristic guide available that conforms to 
common sense and existing practice, at least for the capabilities of firms competing in markets.  
Consider a hypothetical firm “in equilibrium”, an organization that keeps earning its living by 
producing and selling the same product, on the same scale and to the same customer population 
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over time.  The capabilities exercised in that stationary process are the zero level capabilities, the 
“how we earn a living now” capabilities.  Without them, the firm could not collect the revenue 
from its customers that allows it to buy more inputs and do the whole thing over again. By 
contrast, capabilities that would change the product, the production process, the scale or the 
customers (markets) served are not at the zero level.  New product development, as practiced in 
many firms, is a prototypical example of a first order “dynamic capability”.  The capabilities that 
support the creation of new outlets by McDonalds or Starbucks are another prototypical example, 
focused on the domain of scale and (geographic) markets rather than product attributes.  These 
examples are prototypical because they unquestionably involve first order change, given the 
definition of the zero level, and it is equally beyond question that they are highly patterned and 
“routine” in many respects.  Given the terminological framework under construction here, these 
examples are a conclusive answer to anyone who doubts the “existence” of dynamic capabilities.  
(Of course, their doubts may relate to a different understanding of “dynamic capability.”) 
It is worth noting that the “zero level” is only locally defined.  For a firm that does its 
own R&D, the producing and selling the product is zero order activity.  For an independent R&D 
lab, developing new products is zero order activity. 
There are many ways to change.  It is quite possible to change without having a dynamic 
capability.  To begin with, change often occurs by force majeure from the environment, 
predictably or not, for better or worse.  Whether it is because such an external challenge arrives 
or because an autonomous decision to change is made at a high level, organizations often have to 
cope with problems they are not well prepared for.  They may be pushed into “fire fighting” 
mode, a high-paced, contingent, opportunistic and perhaps creative search for satisfactory 
alternative behaviors.  It is useful to have a name for the category of such change behaviors that 
do not depend on dynamic capabilities  – behavior that are largely non-repetitive and at least 
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“intendedly rationa l” and not merely reactive or passive.  I propose “ad hoc problem-solving”.  
Ad hoc problem solving is not routine; in particular, not highly patterned and not repetitious.  As 
suggested above, it typically appears as a response to novel challenges from the environment or 
other relatively unpredictable events.  Thus, ad hoc problem solving and the exercise of dynamic 
capabilities are two different ways to change – or two categories comprising numerous different 
ways to change.   
Of course, close study of a series of “fires” may well reveal that there is pattern even in 
“fire fighting.”  Some of the pattern may be learned and contribute positively to effectiveness, 
and in that sense be akin to a skill or routine.  In organizational improvisation, as in jazz, creative 
achievement typically rises from a foundation of patterned and practiced performance, a fund of 
micro-patterns that are recombined and sequenced in creative ways  (Miner, Bassoff and 
Moorman 2001).   Responses to highly dynamic environments may also be patterned at a higher 
level, guided by adherence to relatively simple rules and structural principles (Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000).  At the other end of the spectrum, even the most incremental effort at product 
modification can run into unexpected snags that are beyond the scope of the dynamic capability, 
and require a complementary dose of ad hoc problem solving.  To acknowledge these points is 
not, however, to concede that there is no difference between dynamic capabilities and ad hoc 
problem solving; to say that would be to indulge in the “shades of gray” fallacy.  For the 
concepts and the contrast to be useful aids to understanding, it is not necessary that the pure 
forms exist in the world, or even that we have high “inter-rater reliability” in sorting real cases 
into only two conceptual boxes. 
Contrasting cost structures.  Dynamic capabilities typically involve long-term 
commitments to specialized resources.  The more pervasive and detailed the patterning of the 
activity involved, the higher the costs of the commitments tend to be. The ability to sustain a 
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particular patterned approach to new product development, for example, depends to some extent 
on continuity in the engineering personnel involved; there may be substantial continuity in 
facilities and equipment as well.  Similarly, an established replicator organization has a central 
staff that is the locus of its ability to bring together real estate, design skills, construction, 
equipment and furnishings, advertising campaigns, new employees, etc., and create a new outlet.  
The size of that central capability determines the pace at which new outlets can be opened.  For 
these sorts of commitments to be economically sound, the capability must be exercised: to have a 
dynamic capability and find no occasion for change is merely to carry a cost burden.   On the 
other hand, an aggressive search for such occasions may also be a mistake.  Attempting too much 
change – perhaps in a deliberate effort to exercise the dynamic capability – can impose 
additional costs when the frequent disruption of the underlying capability outweighs the 
competitive value of the novelty achieved.  There is an ecological demand for balance between 
the costs of the capability and the use that is actually made of it. 
By contrast, the costs of ad hoc problem solving largely disappear if there is no problem 
to solve.  Many of those costs take the form of opportunity costs of personnel who have 
alternative productive roles in the (zero level) capability.  True, it is conceivable that a similar 
pattern could obtain in an organization that had dynamic capabilities.  This would mean that 
people could step out of their zero-level roles and into their dynamic capability roles – their 
learned, patterned change roles – and then step back again when change was completed.  The 
plausibility of this image is undercut by the “rustiness” problem: successful maintenance of a 
skill or routine typically requires frequent exercise.  Regardless of whether that objection is 
decisive in itself, it seems that, in practice, prominent examples of dynamic capabilities generally 
involve a lot of specialized personnel who are committed full time to their change roles, and 
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other types of investments as well.  The contrast with the lighter cost burdens of ad hoc problem 
solving is clear. 
No “rule for riches” here.  It should now be apparent that it is not necessarily 
advantageous for a firm to invest in (first order) dynamic capabilities.  Rivals who rely on ad hoc 
problem- solving to accomplish change when needed are carrying a lower cost burden.  If 
opportunities for competitively significant change are sparse enough or expensive enough to 
realize, then the added cost of dynamic capabilities will not be matched by corresponding 
benefits on the average – even if an occasional notable success might suggest the contrary.  Also, 
if the change environment does sustain dynamic capabilities relative to ordinary capabilities 
(plus ad hoc problem-solving), competition among many firms pursuing a similar dynamic 
capabilities strategy may compete away the rents, because (e.g.) product markets are saturated 
with rival innovations or because the salaries of scientists and engineers are bid up.  A related 
and long-familiar example of a disadvantageous dynamic capability is innovative R&D that does 
not pay off in the presence of strong rivals who invest only in imitative R&D (See, e.g., Nelson 
and Winter 1982.) The (descriptive) rule for riches is to occupy a favored and relatively un-
contested place in the ecology of behaviors – for example, by having a strong R&D unit when 
others in the industry lack both innovative and imitative capabilities.  While an individual actor 
can exert some influence on that ecology, it may well have difficulty in identifying the favored 
and uncontested niches, or in forestalling unfavorable change after such a niche has been 
exploited for a while.  Hence, the rule is of little prescriptive value. 
Higher order capabilities.  If exogenous change is “competence destroying” at the level of 
first order dynamic capabilities, those who invest in routinizing the response to familiar types of 
change may find themselves disadvantaged relative to more flexible players who have invested 
in higher order capabilities.  Deliberate investments in organizational learning may, for example, 
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facilitate the creation and modification of dynamic capabilities for the management of 
acquisitions or alliance (Zollo and Winter 2002).  Collis (1994) argues that the existence of 
higher order capabilities provides a rebuttal to any claim that there is generally advantage to be 
had from strength at any particular level of dynamic capability: there is always a higher level, 
and in his view superiority at the higher level always “trumps” superiority at a lower level.  Here, 
the same skeptical conclusion about advantage rests on the alternative argument that ad hoc 
problem solving is always a substitute for dynamic capability and may be economically superior.  
Collis also makes, however, the related interesting suggestion that there is a historical tendency 
for the locus of competitive action to rise in the capability hierarchy.  Strategic innovation often 
involves “changing the game” in a way that “takes it to a higher level” – a phrase that often 
connotes a focus on strengthening higher order change capabilities.  This notion appeals at the 
descriptive level and there is clearly some logic to it.  Knowledge advances cumulatively, 
imitation spreads solutions around, and problems that are visible, urgent and recur at high 
frequency tend to get solved before problems with the opposite attributes.   But these 
considerations do not suffice to make the progression to a higher “order” of competition a logical 
necessity, since the levels differ in the cost-benefit balance of capability investments, and 
exogenous change could at any time tip an existing balance in favor of lower order capabilities 
supplemented by ad hoc problem solving.  The argument for such upward progression is 
therefore missing an appropriate assumption that restricts the character of exogenous change in 
such a way as to assure that the investment in higher order capabilities tends to pay off, while the 
cost-cutting move in the opposite direction does not.  Just how such an assumption might be 
framed is unclear, but the logic is incomplete without it. 
Reprise.  Probably some of the mystery and confusion surrounding the concept of 
dynamic capability arises from linking the concept too tightly to notions of generalized 
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effectiveness at dealing with change and generic formulas for sustainable competitive advantage.  
The argument here is that clarity is served by breaking this linkage.  There is no way to hedge 
against every contingency.  There is no general rule for riches.  That investing in dynamic 
capabilities (of whatever order) can be a partial hedge against the obsolescence of existing 
capability, and can sometimes yield relatively sustainable advantage, is obvious from the nature 
of “dynamic capability,” as defined here.  That this cannot be uniformly or inevitably 
advantageous is equally obvious, from the meaning of “investing”: the thought experiment of 
raising the costs while holding the gross benefits constant makes the net benefit disappear, and 
certainly the world is capable of turning such a thought experiment into a real experiment.  The 
concept of dynamic capability is a helpful addition to the tool kit of strategic analysis, but 
strategic analysis itself remains a matter of understanding how the idiosyncratic attributes of the 
individual firm affect its prospects in a particular competitive context. 
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